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THE NATURE OF THE DEAL IN THE POST-CRISIS
FINANCIAL MARKET
MICHAEL E. SYKUTA*
Small businesses face unique challenges and opportunities
in acquiring financial capital, including the availability
and terms of financing arrangements. The terms and
conditions of financial deals allocate value, uncertainty
(and its consequent risks), and decision rights between the
parties to the deal in a manner that balances parties'
interests in light of the information asymmetry, incentives
and potential for opportunism within the context of the
deal. However, the nature and sources of value and
uncertainty, the kinds of decision rights available to
parties, and the resulting information and incentive issues
are directly influenced by the larger market and regulatory
context. In this paper, I discuss some of the ways the recent
financial crisis, federal bailouts, and new regulations have
changed the contracting environment for small business
finance and the implications for the availability and terms
offinancial arrangements for small businesses.
I. INTRODUCTION
The "Great Recession" of 2008 sent the U.S. economy into turmoil.
The U.S. housing market experienced severe decline with record numbers
of mortgage defaults and foreclosures. Financial markets were upended as
major financial institutions experienced distress due to the collapse of the
subprime mortgage market and drastically reduced values for mortgage-
backed securities on banks' balance sheets. Financial distress spilled over
into other sectors of the economy as companies-big and small-found it
increasingly difficult to access financial capital and as consumer confidence
and spending declined. Businesses cut back or closed, leading to the highest
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unemployment rates in decades. Small businesses loan failure rates reached
12% by early 2009.'
Small businesses have long been touted as the primary source of job
creation, so it is little wonder that attention would revolve around the
question of how to help small businesses recover from the economic
2downturn. Many critics have pointed to the financial industry and its
failure to lend to small businesses as one reason for the rapid growth in
small business failure rates in 2010.3 However, a 2010 National Federation
of Independent Business survey found that 52% of small businesses did not
seek to borrow capital in 2010. Of those that did, 60% received all or most
of the amount requested, suggesting financing might have been more
available than commonly argued .
My purpose in this paper is to address how the Great Recession has
affected the nature of financial deals and its implication for small
businesses. In order to do so, I first outline a framework for analyzing the
economic fundamentals of a transaction and how those economic issues are
addressed in the structure of the deal. I then examine the fundamentals of
financial deals and the issues they raise for both borrowers and lenders.
Given that foundation, I then consider how the events and policies
stemming from the financial crisis affect the incentives and value of small
business financial deals. Finally, I conclude with some suggestions on how
those factors are likely to continue affecting small business financing in the
post-crisis economy.
Emily Maltby, Small Biz Loan Failure Rate Hits 12%, CNNMoNEY (Feb. 25,
2009, 11:20 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2009/02/25/smallbusiness/
smallbiz loan defaults soar.smb/.
2 John C. Haltiwanger, Ron S. Jarmin & Javier Miranda, Who Creates Jobs? Small
vs. Large vs. Young (U.S. Census Bureau Ctr. for Econ. Studies, Working Paper
No. CES-WP- 10-17), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=- 1666157. Haltiwanger
et al. review Census of Business data and find that in fact it is not small firms that
are primarily responsible for job creation, but young firms, which typically happen
to be small. Mature small firms are no more likely to create jobs than are large
firms. Id. This finding suggests that policies to support "small business job
creation" are likely misguided as they dedicate resources on all small businesses,
not necessarily-the ones that are most likely to create new jobs. Id.
3 DUN & BRADSTREET, THE STATE OF SMALL BUSINESSES POST GREAT RECESSION
(May 2011), available at www.dnbgov.com/pdf/DNB_SMB Report May2011 .pdf
(reporting that the small business failure rate in the U.S. increased by 40% between
2007 and 2010).
4 NAT'L FED'N INDEP. Bus. FINANCING SMALL BusiNEss: SMALL BUSINESS AND
CREDIT ACCESS (Jan. 2011), available at http://www.nfib.com/Portals/O/PDF/
AllUsers/research/studies/Small-Business-Credit-Access-NFIB.pdf [hereinafter
FINANCING SMALL BusiNEss]. What these results do not tell us is how many of the
52% of businesses that did not seek to borrow money were discouraged from even
attempting, whether informally or because of the public perception that banks had
tightened small businesses' access to capital.
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II. THE NATURE OF THE DEAL
There are three fundamental elements involved in every transaction. No
matter how big or small the deal, the existence of these fundamentals is
simply a matter of degree. Understanding these basic elements and the
means by which they are addressed, provides an informative lens for
understanding the implications of the current market environment for the
kinds of deals that are more or less likely to occur and the ways in which
those deals that do occur are likely to be structured.5
Every transaction consists of three allocation problems that will be
addressed, whether explicitly or implicitly, intentionally or unintentionally.
First, voluntary economic exchange necessarily implies an allocation of the
value created by the trade, i.e., the gains from trade. Second, every
transaction entails some degree of uncertainty that will be allocated
between the parties. The allocation of uncertainty will determine parties'
exposure to risk and shape parties' incentives. Finally, every transaction
requires certain decisions to be made, and those decision rights are
allocated between the parties. Each of these is important individually, but
they are also interdependent in the sense that how uncertainty and value are
allocated may affect the incentives parties face when exercising their
decision rights, and vice versa.
A. The Allocation of Value
The fundamental purpose of economic exchange is for trading parties to
realize "gains from trade" resulting from the transfer of property rights
from the incumbent holder, who values them less, to the purchaser, who
values them more.6 In a voluntary exchange economy, transactions only
occur if all parties expect to be better off as a result of the transaction; that
5 This framework is also described and applied to the analysis of a particular type
of contract in Michael Sykuta & Joe Parcell, Contract Structure and Design in
Identity-Preserved Soybean Production, 25 REv. OF AGRIC. ECON. 332 (2003). It
was also used as a framework for considering the implications of product
traceability requirements for the organization of agrifood value chains in Michael
Sykuta, Agricultural Organization in an Era of Traceability, 37 J. OF AGRIC. &
APPLIED ECON. 365 (2005).
6 The concept of gains from trade dates back to ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO
THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (Edwin Cannan & George
J. Stigler eds., 1904) (1776), which is the origin of modem economic theory. Smith
argued that the wealth of nations was best measured by the abundance of goods
available for people to consume rather than the amount of gold acquired through
international trade, which implied being a net-exporter of the country's resources.
Id. Smith argued that national wealth, whether at the individual or State level,
would be maximized if producers specialized the producing based on their
comparative advantage and then trading with producers of other goods. Id. Thus,
national well-being is maximized based on specialization and trade. This makes the
efficient design of contracts that govern transactions of particular interest for
maximizing social welfare. Id.
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is, if the transaction is expected to create value for all parties. Before
considering how that value is allocated between parties, it is important first
to understand the nature and source(s) of the value creation in order to
understand the motivation for the transaction.
The value of the transaction is not necessarily determined by the
intrinsic worth of the good or service being transacted. The value to the
buyer is based on how the good or service contributes to the buyer's overall
objectives. This may be for the buyer's immediate personal consumption, in
which case the value is more directly based on the buyer's personal
preferences. However, particularly in business-to-business transactions, the
value of the good is determined more by how the buyer intends to use the
good to create additional value downstream. As a simple example, the value
of purchasing an apple for my personal consumption is likely different from
the value of that same apple if I intend to resell it or turn it into applesauce
and sell it. In the latter case, the value of the apple depends on other
people's willingness to pay for applesauce and my costs of converting the
apple and marketing the final product. Similarly, the value to the seller
depends on the seller's alternative uses for the product; in this simple
analogy, the availability of another buyer or the seller's ability to consume
or make use of the apple herself.
B. Allocation of Uncertainty
In a world of imperfect information and foresight, the only certainty is
the presence of uncertainty. Even in the most simple of transactions there is
at least some small degree of uncertainty, though it may not be of material
consequence to the trading parties However, as the duration of a
transaction lengthens or as the complexity of a transaction increases, the
degree of uncertainty increases along with the number of sources of
uncertainty. The value of contracts as legally enforceable promises is in
dealing with uncertainty about whether parties will honor their promises,
i.e., to deal with behavioral uncertainty between the parties. The need for
such an institution stems from uncertainty about the future and all the
possible environmental and economic conditions that might give a party
incentive to behave differently than she originally agreed.
It is important in this context to note that uncertainty and risk are not
synonymous, at least not in the way that the term "risk" is commonly used.
To see this, consider the prospect of an investment that will generate a net
return of 10% or 20%, with equal probability. Although there is uncertainty
about the outcome, this might be considered a win-win proposition since
the investor is guaranteed a net return of no less than 10%. There is no
7 Uncertainty that involves sufficiently low probabilities of negative outcomes or
sufficiently small negative outcomes may be dismissed as negligible.
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"risk" in the sense that the investor might lose value. More generally, risk is
typically associated with the likelihood of negative outcomes.
How the contract terms allocate uncertainty among parties will
determine which party bears what risks associated with the uncertainty. For
instance, a fixed-price, long-term supply contract eliminates the nominal
price uncertainty of the deal and may stabilize cash flows. However, the
fixed-price terms expose both parties to the risk that the real price will
move adversely to their position and create opportunity costs of lost value.
Both parties also enjoy the positive possibility that the real price will move
in favor of their position, creating economic rents. On the other hand, the
same contract with variable-price terms ensures the economic value of the
product will be accurately reflected, but exposes both sides to cash flow
uncertainty. The allocation of uncertainty determines the relative payoffs of
parties under different states of the world, which affects their incentives to
perform undei the terms of the deal and the amount of value actually
created.
C. Allocation of Decision Rights
The ability to make a decision has value, particularly when that
decision has economic or financial implications. Who gets to make what
decisions related to the performance of the contract can have significant
implications for the amount of value created in the transaction, the level of
uncertainty affecting the transaction and the way in which the risks
associated with that uncertainty are borne. Even in very routine
transactions, decision rights can have significant consequences. Consider
the decision right for method of payment at the local store. The store owner
may implicitly give consumers the decision right for choosing the method
of payment: cash, debit or credit, and if credit, which type of card. These
are not all equal from the store owner's perspective. Cash imposes no
transaction fee on the store owner, while debit and credit purchases do.
There is also a difference in the fee between debit and credit, and between
different credit cards. The consumer's exercise of her decision rights
reduces the value of the transaction to the store owner. The store owner
may limit the decision rights consumers have by only accepting cash,
requiring a minimum purchase for the use of credit or accepting only
certain credit cards. This may reduce the value of the transaction to either or
both parties depending on the consumer's payment preferences.
Alternatively, the store owner could allow consumers the full set of
decision rights, but charge the consumer for the fees associated with the
consumer's choice, thus transferring the loss in value of the transaction
from the store owneK to the consumer.
Now consider how many more decisions may be involved in a more
complex transaction than simply checking out at the grocery store.
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Decisions concerning selection of raw materials, production processes,
quality determination, delivery, inspection and payment; there are a
multitude of different decisions involved in typical transactions. Not all
may be material to the nature of the value of the deal, but it is important to
understand those that do affect value and how they can be allocated
-between parties to maximize the value of the deal.
It is also important to recognize the option-like nature of decision
rights. As a financial instrument, a call (put) option is the right, but not the
obligation, to buy (sell) an asset at a pre-specified "strike" price before a
specified maturity date.8 The value of the option depends on the value of
the underlying asset relative to the strike price, the volatility of the price of
the asset, the time. value of money and the time to maturity. Transaction
decision rights provide similar value, though they may not be as clearly
structured.9 Recognizing the option nature of decision rights and the factors
that affect option value can lend new insights to incentive issues between
trading parties. Contract breach is perhaps the most evident "option," whose
value is determined in part by the "strike price" of the breach remedy.10
D. The Structure of the Deal
The structure of the deal affects the allocations of value, uncertainty
and decision rights underlying the deal by stipulating the terms governing
those allocations. From an economic perspective, the structure of the deal
can be broken down usefully to three aspects of organizational architecture:
the assignment of decision rights, the creation of incentive systems and the
specification of performance measures.11 These three dimensions of the
structure must be aligned with the objectives of the transaction and must be
designed in such a way as to complement one another to ensure effective
performance.
'Call Option, INVESTOPEDIA.COM, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/
calloption.asp#axzzlqRICHu5m (last visited Mar. 28, 2012).
9 See LEON TRIGEORGIS, REAL OPTIONS: MANAGERIAL FLEXIBILITY AND
STRATEGY IN RESOURCE ALLOCATION (1996) (discussing a complete treatment of
the nature of "real options" and their implications for business decision making).
10 This real option perspective of contract breach and the economic notion of
efficient breach supports the argument that liquidated damages should be more
widely used in contracts, since parties would be able to value more effectively the
option to breach. When the breach remedy is uncertain, there is a greater
p robability of both inefficient breach and inefficient performance.
JAMES BRICKLEY, CLIFFORD SMITH & JEROLD ZIMMERMAN, MANAGERIAL
ECONOMICS AND ORGANIZATIONAL ARCHITECTURE (McGraw-Hill, 4th ed. 2006).
Brickley, Smith and Zimmerman contend that organizational architecture consists
of these three dimensions and illustrate their interdependenco as a three-legged
stool. Id. If any of the three is out of line with the others, the stool will be
"wobbly." Id. Thus, special attention has to be given to ensure the three aspects of
organizational architecture are balanced in order to achieve effective performance.
Id.
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As argued above, the allocation of decision rights is a fundamental
element of the transaction. So what factors determine the optimal allocation
of decision rights? From an organizational economics perspective, decision
rights should be allocated where they add the most value to the enterprise.
Good decision-making requires both the appropriate knowledge set and
access to the necessary information. Some information is more easily
communicated or codified; some is more tacit and difficult to convey.
Decision rights ideally should be co-located with the specialized
information necessary for effective decision-making. However, access to
information needs to be balanced with the ability to create appropriate
incentives for the decisionmaker.
The authority to make decisions without an incentive for making
decisions well is likely to yield undesirable outcomes. To create appropriate
incentives, rewards should reflect the value created by good decision-
making. Incentives must be related to things over which the decision maker
exercises influence; otherwise, the incentive system has little power to
influence behavior. For instance, compensating a regional sales manager
based on total system sales would provide a weaker incentive than one tied
to regional sales, since the total system sales includes results from beyond
the region of the manager's control. Similarly, stock options may provide
some incentive for an administrative clerk to do his job well, but not as
strong an incentive as it might provide executive managers who have a
more direct effect on corporate performance.
Incentives cannot be effectively implemented without performance
measures that capture whether good decisions are being made. Performance
measures should be closely aligned with the value objectives of the
transaction. A supply agreement might evaluate quality characteristics,
timeliness, or other attributes that contribute to the value of the transaction.
A sales agreement might specify net versus gross sales, if product returns or
discounts could be avoided through more effective sales practices. Often,
the ideal measure of performance can be measured only imperfectly. In
these cases it is especially important to consider how the proxy may result
in suboptimal incentives. Finally, while performance measures need to
reflect the decisionmaker's actions, they also need to be beyond the
decisionmaker's ability to manipulate. Failure to protect against
manipulation of performance measures has been the Achilles' heel of more
than one major finance company in the past twenty years.' 2
12 In 1995, Barings Bank, then the oldest investment bank in Britain, collapsed
under $1 billion in losses created by a lone trader in a Singapore office who knew
how to manipulate the internal accounting system to inflate his trading records and
hide losses. Howard Chua-Eoan, The Collapse of Barings Bank, 1995, TIME, Mar.
1, 2007. UBS AG, a large Swiss bank, is currently under investigation for its failure
to maintain appropriate internal controls in the case of an equities trader who made
unauthorized transactions that cost the bank approximately $2.3 billion. Goran
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These three aspects of organizational architecture work in concert to
effect organizational performance. This is no less true in the design of
contracts. Which party is best positioned to make what decisions as they
relate to the value of the deal? What incentives are created by the specified
allocations of value and uncertainty? How can performance be measured to
ensure appropriate rewards or penalties? Would a different allocation of
decision rights facilitate more effective incentives and performance
measures? Which party holds the default decision rights in cases of
contractual incompleteness, and what incentives would prevail in those
cases?13 These questions and their implications for the value of the deal
need to be considered when evaluating the structure of the deal.
III. THE NATURE OF THE FINANCIAL DEAL
The above framework can be used to analyze any kind of transaction
relationship or contract structure. It is particularly useful for considering the
effects of various market and institutional factors on the value and design of
transaction terms. In this section, I will go through the framework in the
specific context of financial deals. While each deal has its own
idiosyncrasies, the general nature of the deal is essentially the same. The
specifics of the situations and terms reflect more a matter of degree than a
difference in nature.
A. Value of the Deal
Financial deals fall in that class of transactions the value of which is
based not on the good itself, but on what access to the good allows the
buyer (borrower) to do. The value created in a financing deal is the
difference between the expected return-on-investment (ROI) generated by
the borrower's use of the funds and the lender's opportunity cost of
providing the funds to the borrower. While this may be more readily
apparent in the case of project financing, since we can conceptualize the
project's ROI, it is equally true of working capital financing that allows a
firm to conduct current business activities in anticipation of future sales.
Mijuk, Swiss, UK Launch Enforcement Proceedings in UBS Trading Scandal,
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 3, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20120203-
706798.html. In the UBS case, the trader allegedly maintained fraudulent
accounting records to hide his trading activity. Id.13 Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A
Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. EcoN. 691 (1986); Oliver
Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON.
1119 (1990) (defining the term "residual rights of control" to describe the default
decision rights under conditions of contractual incompleteness). Hart and Moore
define asset ownership by the possession of residual control rights and construct a
theory of firm integration based on the relative incentives of parties in cases when
performance measures are observable but not verifiable. Id.
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Any factors affecting the borrower's expected ROI or (net) cash flows
from financed activities will affect the value of the deal. When the economy
is slow or declining, prospects for positive net-present-value (NPV) projects
may decline, making financing less valuable to the borrower. Likewise,
changes in market conditions that increase costs may increase short-term
demand for financing while reducing long-term demand if revenues are not
expected to keep pace with increasing costs. Conversely, a growing
economy typically means more positive NPV opportunities, which makes
financing more valuable. Internal factors also affect the value of external
financing to the borrower. Businesses that are more cash-constrained may
value financing more as a means to avoid losing previous investments in the
enterprise.
From the lender's perspective, the value of the deal depends on several
factors as well. First, the availability of other borrowers with expected
returns (on a risk-adjusted basis) equal to or greater than the present
borrower determines the lender's immediate opportunity cost. By lending
now, the lender also foregoes the option of lending to another borrower the
amount of any outstanding principal for the life of the deal. This
opportunity cost of future lending may encourage lenders to withhold
financing today or to give preference to shorter maturities if they expect
better borrowers in the future (perhaps due to an economic recovery) and/or
a reduction in the supply of loanable funds in the future. Finally, increased
reserve requirements and costs of lending will also reduce the lender's
value of the deal since the opportunity cost for the loanable funds and the
cost of executing the deal both increase.
How the value of the deal is allocated is, in some sense, the defining
characteristic of financial deals. Whether debt or equity, the primary
difference among types of financing is the nature of the supplier's claim on
the borrower's cash flows and assets. Debt involves a claim based on the
amount of financing itself rather than on the value the borrower creates with
the financing. Equity, particularly common stock, proportionally shares in
the economic value created by the financing. Thus the terms of these
different financial claims differ based on the nature of the claim and the
incentives those claims create for both parties with respect to the value
created by the deal.
B. Uncertainty in the Deal
There are multiple sources of uncertainty that affect the value of
financial deals. Each source of uncertainty has its own set of consequences
for the value of the deal, contractual performance, incentives and
monitoring and enforcement costs.
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1. Economic Uncertainty
Simple economic uncertainty affects the value of the deal itself because
it typically means more uncertain ROIs. Borrowers and lenders may have
greater uncertainty about the borrower's ability to repay due to more
uncertain future cash flows. Economic uncertainty also increases
information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders, since borrowers
have better information about their specific businesses and industries.
Greater systemic uncertainty may mask the idiosyncratic uncertainties of
the borrower. This creates a greater opportunity for moral hazard behavior
on the part of the borrower since she can argue that weak cash flows are the
result of larger economic forces and not her ineffective use (or misuse) of
finances. This becomes more of a problem if the lender is unable to identify
and negotiate performance measures that are more directly related to the
borrower's business practices regardless the state of the general economy or
the borrower's industry setting.
14
The size and growth of the U.S. federal debt is another source of
potential economic uncertainty. Douglas Elmendorf, Director of the
Congressional Budget Office, argues that even a healthy economic recovery
will be insufficient to support current projected debt levels and that
servicing the debt will require significant changes in federal expenditures
and/or revenues.' 5 Either of those remedies suggests at least short-term
economic consequences, as reductions in federal expenditures may result in
short-term decreases in economic activity and as increases in taxes dampen
economic activity long-term. This uncertainty affects the potential value of
the deal for both small business borrowers and lenders.
2. Regulatory Uncertainty Affecting Borrowers
Uncertainty about regulations, regulatory requirements and their
associated costs creates another source of uncertainty for borrowers. In the
current political environment, great uncertainty persists around the
implementation and effects of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act of 2010 (PPACA). 16 There continues to be disagreement about the
14 Ningzhong Li, Negotiated Measurement Rules in Debt Contracts, 48 J. ACCT.
REs. 1103 (2010) (discussing contractual definitions of net income and net worth in
a large sample of private debt contracts and finding that parties tend to define net
income differently from Generally Accepted Accounting Practices (GAAP) when
net income plays a more important role in the contract when transitory earnings are
less informative of financial performance). Li's results demonstrate how parties
intentionally design efficient performance measures and structure decision rights
q.e., choice of accounting methods) to effect those measures). Id.Douglas W. Elmendorf, Four Observations about the Federal Budget, 46 Bus.
ECON. 139 (2011).16 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
124 Stat. 119 (2010).
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relative benefits to small businesses of health care tax credits and increased
insurance benefit costs associated with federally mandated coverage
requirements. If the cost of providing health care benefits exceeds the relief
provided by tax credits, small businesses will have less need for financial
capital. Moreover, increased costs for hiring additional employees will
reduce the value of financing to expand businesses. While there are myriad
forms of government regulation on business, health care reform is
undoubtedly the most broad sweeping in its implications for small business
profitability and finance.
3. Regulatory Uncertainty Affecting Lenders
Lenders are also subject to a range of regulatory uncertainty following
the 2008 financial crisis. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank) marked the most sweeping
overhaul of financial markets since the 1930s. 17 The legislation calls for
over 240 rules involving eleven different federal agencies. The regulation
touches every facet of financial markets, from consumer banking fees to
credit cards to personal and commercial lending to securities markets.
Because the legislation is so wide sweeping and so open-ended in its
possible regulatory outcomes, lenders face a great unknown for the future
cost of doing business in any form of financing. The regulations not only
implicate pricing and costs for doing businesses, but also impose new legal
standards and potential liabilities for the process as well as the product of
financial deals. Uncertainty around these regulatory costs makes financing
of any kind more difficult and costly for lenders to originate.
4. Behavioral Uncertainty
In addition to the myriad of extemal sources of uncertainty that may
affect the value of the deal over time, there is also uncertainty stemming
from the decisions and actions of the parties to the contract themselves.
Moral hazard is the incentive parties have to take advantage of information
asymmetry between parties to make decisions that violate the spirit, if not
the letter, of the agreement. If detected, moral hazard behavior may be
grounds for breach; however, incompleteness of contracts may give rise to
any number of opportunities for one party to act in ways that are not
explicitly prohibited under the terms of the contract.
In light of the incentive for borrowers not to repay money they borrow
or to use the money for purposes other than those proposed to acquire the
17 Summary of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Enacted into Law on July 21, 2010, DAVISPOLK, Jul. 21, 2010, at i, available at
http://www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/7084f9fe-6580-413b-b870-
b7c025ed2ecfiPresentation/PublicationAttachment/1 d4495c7-ObeO-4e9a-ba77-
f786fb90464a/0709 10_FinancialReformSummary.pdf.
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funding, the basic objective of the lender is to ask the question, "How do I
get my money back?" Many of the terms of financial deals focus on this
basic question. Here again, the nature of the claims on cash flow and deal
value reveal some of those differences. Debt holders have first claims on
cash flow (relative to equity holders), thereby reducing the uncertainty of
repayment. They do not share proportionally in the economic value created
by the financing deal, so they have little interest in the borrower's ability to
achieve supernormal returns on the use of funds and are more concerned
about the possible loss of their contractual claims. Seniority of debt claims
and securitization through the value of the borrower's assets are additional
ways debt holders may reduce the uncertainty of recuperating their funds.
Equity holders share in the uncertainty of value creation and only
recoup their money if the business is able to cover all other claims on cash
flow. However, because equity holders have no contractual guarantee of
repayment to begin with, there is limited downside risk. Since equity
holders share in the upside potential, equity holders have an incentive to
support management's pursuit of higher-risk, higher-reward investments;
that is, investments with a higher probability of supernormal returns and a
higher probability of loss. This incentive is particularly strong if current
cash flows fail to generate sufficient returns to cover all other claims and a
repayment to equity.
This tension between equity and debt holders' interests in the
uncertainty of cash flows and probability of repayment creates a
misalignment of incentives between the borrower and lender when the
borrower has well-diversified equity holdings. In a sense, equity holders
(through management) hold an option to "repurchase" the cash flows of the
firm by paying off its debt obligations. Option theory illustrates that the
value of this option increases with the uncertainty in the value of the
borrower's expected future cash flows. As a result, debt holders not only
have an incentive to strengthen their claims to the cash flows or to
securitize the loan through tangible assets, but also to limit the decision
making authority of equity holders/management to prevent excessive risk-
taking behavior.
C. Decision Rights in the Deal
Financial deals involve a myriad of decision rights that affect the value
and uncertainty of the deal, as illustrated above. Many of those decision
rights are fairly obvious, such as when payments are due and to whom and
how payments should be made. But, there are many other less obvious
decision rights that have consequences. Even something as seemingly
innocuous as the currency for repayment may be a decision right that could,
and often does, come into play. Aside from terms describing the
responsibilities of the parties in the actual payment and repayment process,
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decision rights are often allocated with the purpose of reducing information
asymmetries and mitigating moral hazard incentives, particularly but not
necessarily on the part of the borrower.
For example, a line of credit or revolving credit agreement typically
allows the borrower to choose when to use the financing, creating an option
value for the borrower to use (or not) the financing when it is most
advantageous to her and requiring the lender to maintain sufficient liquid
reserves to meet the request for cash. There is an implied opportunity cost
on the part of the lender to tie up cash commitments that may never be
tapped. Hence, it is not unusual for such finance agreements to maintain
minimum take-or-pay provisions or charge additional fees to cover the cost
of the option, whether the additional fees are flat fees or tied proportionally
to the unused balance. However, such agreements also allow the lender to
evaluate the borrower's position at the time the funds are requested,
enabling the lender to take advantage of new or better information about the
borrower's credit worthiness since the time at which the deal was first
negotiated. This may reduce the ex ante costs of negotiating and originating
the financing agreement.
Decision rights regarding financial reporting requirements reflect
lenders' interests in measuring the borrower's overall financial performance
as a proxy for the borrower's expected ability to repay during the course of
the agreement. The challenge with most such performance measures is that
they are generated by the borrower's accounting practices and reporting
standards, hence the frequent requirement for third-party verification (i.e.,
audits). The choice of performance measures and how they may be
calculated also needs to be tailored to the nature of the borrower's business
operations to ensure they more accurately measure actual ability to repay.
18
Debt terms regarding asset securitization, maintenance, deployment and
restrictions on use of funds and course of business all limit decision rights
of borrowers in attempt to mitigate moral hazard incentives. Determination
of default conditions and consequences establish decision rights for the
lender to protect her cash flow claims by granting the implicit option to call
the debt or effect default conditions. Explicit options may grant lenders the
decision right to convert their claims to equity positions, thus allowing them
to benefit proportionally from effective value creation, or may grant
borrowers the ability to terminate the debt early through prepayment of a
loan or calling (buying back) a bond or note. These various decision rights
create different incentives for either party with respect to the value of the
deal and the allocation of value that is realized ex post. 19
:8 See Li, supra note 14.
19 Chris Anderson, Financial Contracting Under Extreme Uncertainty: An Analysis
of Brazilian Corporate Debentures, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 45 (1999) (discussing how
various combinations of decision rights in corporate debentures can be used to
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IV. THE "GREAT RECESSION" AND THE NATURE OF THE DEAL
The motivating question for this paper is how the "Great Recession" of
2008-2009 has affected the nature of financial contracting for small
businesses. By this point, it should be no surprise that the conclusion is not
that the nature of the deal has changed, but that the nature of the contracting
environment has changed. Understanding the fundamentals of financial
transactions provides a framework through which to consider why and how
financial deals themselves may be affected by the financial crisis and by the
policies that have been adopted since and that are still in the process of
being defined and implemented.
A. General Economic Malaise and Uncertainty
General economic malaise reduces the potential value to be created in
any financial deal since a slow economy typically means slower or negative
growth in cash flows.. Small businesses typically have smaller, less
diversified consumer bases, leaving small businesses more susceptible to
economic instability than large, particularly multi-national, businesses in
part because small business are not geographically diversified across
economic regions. As a result, small businesses are likely to have fewer
value-creating opportunities in which to invest than large businesses, and
therefore have a lower demand for financing to begin with.
On the other side of the deal, many lenders found themselves with less
capital available to lend as a result of defaults on existing loans, particularly
loans related to the home mortgage market. Concern over the soundness of
the banking industry also led to demands for banks to increase their cash
reserves, further reducing the amount of capital available to lend.20 Given a
relative scarcity of capital and regulatory pressure to bolster reserves, banks
were forced to tighten credit standards. Because large firms tend to be less
susceptible than small firms to the economic slowdown and have more
available assets on hand for securitizing the value of the deal, large firms
tend to be more attractive borrowers.
This availability of assets to securitize the loan became especially
problematic during this financial crisis due to the role of the home mortgage
industry as a contributing factor in the financial distress of major lending
institutions. Small business owners' homes are most often the business
effect self-enforcing incentives, particularly in the context of great uncertainty and
institutional failure).20 Banks can choose to increase reserves either by reducing their assets (i.e. reduce
lending) or by recapitalizing with additional infusions of equity. Jung-Soon Hyu &
Byung-Kun Rhee, Bank Capital Regulation and Credit Supply, 35 J. BANKING &
FIN. 323 (2011) (discussing that under capital-based regulation, banks have an
incentive to reduce assets rather than recapitalize even when there is no cost to
recapitalization).
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owner's most valuable asset and frequently are used as security for
business-related loans.21 Record-level home mortgage default and
foreclosure rates during the recession reduced home and property values
around the country, and continue to suppress real estate prices due to a glut
of housing stock on the market. As a result, small business owners' often
primary source of security for financing is worth less, further reducing the
value of financing deals to small businesses.
B. The "Stimulus" Distortion
While the net effectiveness of the federal "stimulus" and bailout
programs remains debatable, there is no denying that some industries and
businesses benefited greatly. For instance, suppliers to large bailout
recipients like General Motors and Chrysler clearly benefited more than
suppliers to other automobile manufacturers. Firms in or related to
industries targeted for stimulus spending, such as construction or so-called
"green energy," benefited more than those in non-targeted industries. To the
extent lenders had money available to lend, this government intervention
distorted the costs and benefits of lending to different groups of (small)
businesses. Businesses that benefited more directly from these federal
spending programs faced less economic uncertainty and higher expected
returns than businesses that were not direct recipients of federal spending.
The existence of borrowers who could demonstrate secure revenue streams,
whether in the form of direct government support or contracts with
government-supported businesses, decreased the uncertainty cost of lending
to such entities and increased the opportunity cost of lending to small
businesses that could not demonstrate such revenue stability.
C. The (Unintended) Consequences of Financial Market Regulations
Financial regulations at the time of the crisis and since have further
implications for small businesses' access to financial capital. Capital-based
regulation, which requires banks to maintain a minimum capital adequacy
ratio, is one factor cited for the spiraling of the worldwide financial crisis in
2007.22 As the value of banks' capital base declined, banks reduced lending
in order to maintain their capital adequacy requirements rather than
recapitalizing through issuing new securities. Among other reasons for
banks' preference for reduced lending was the cost of recapitalization,
which had been increased as a result of Sarbanes-Oxley.23 This contraction
in the supply of credit precipitated additional financial stress as businesses
that could no longer access financing were unable to continue operating
successfully, placing additional strain on banks' assets.
21 See FINANCING SMALL BUSINESS, supra note 4, at 29.
22 Hyu & Rhee, supra note 20.
23 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
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Financial market reforms coming out of the recession create additional
costs and uncertainties that are likely to affect small businesses' access to
financing. Elements of Dodd-Frank that have already been implemented
have increased the cost of using credit cards, both for consumers and
retailers. This cost has been particularly felt by small retail businesses that
may have small per-ticket transaction values.24 Credit cards, both personal
ard business, continue to be one of the primary sources of funding for small
business owners. Over 75% of small business use credit card financing and
roughly 25% rely exclusively on credit card financing.25 Reforms that
further increase issuers and users' costs of credit cards will restrict small
business financing.
It is now almost twenty months since the passage of Dodd-Frank and
more than forty rules and reports have yet to be taken up by the Securities
and Exchange Commission staff.26 Scores more have yet to be finalized.
The amount of uncertainty facing the lending institutions continues to be
very high. Banks continue to hold near-record levels of excess reserves.27
This uncertainty around pending regulations and their implications for the
cost of providing financial services continues to be a drag on banks'
willingness to lend. Current proposals to address lingering malaise in the
home mortgage market by requiring banks to pay for refinancing mortgages
at reduced appraised values only add to the uncertainty and further reduce
the amount and value of funds available for small business lending.28
V. CONCLUSION
If anything is clear at present, it is that regulatory uncertainty will
continue to present challenges for small business financing, even as the
economy shows signs of a slow but stable recovery. Proposals to reform
financial markets have real implications for the costs of lending, and those
implications are not necessarily homogeneous across potential lenders.
24 Robin Sidel, Debit-Fee Cap Has Nasty Side Effect, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 8, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10001424052970204319004577084613307585768.
html.
25 See FINANCING SMALL BUSINESS, supra note 4, at 11.
26 Implementing Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act-
Upcoming Activity, U. S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/
dodd-frank/dfactivity-upcoming.shtml (last visited Mar. 29, 2012).
27 Aggregate Reserves of Depository Institutions and the Monetary Base, U. S. FED.
REs. (Feb. 16, 2012), http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h3/current.
28 In his State of the Union address on January 24, 2012, President Obama
announced a new initiative to assist home owners whose mortgage principals
exceed the value of their home. Barack Obama, President, U.S.., State of the Union
Address (Jan. 24, 2012). Banks' losses on the refinancing deals are proposed to be
covered by a new fee on the largest of banks that benefitted from federal bailout
money during the recession. See Nick Timiraos, Obama Proposes Mortgage-
Refinance Plan, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 24, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB 10001424052970203806504577181652800384514.html.
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Until those reforms are better known, banks have an incentive to tighten
access to credit either by restricting amounts, increasing interest rates or
shortening maturities.
But, regulatory uncertainty in financial markets is not the only source
of uncertainty affecting the value of small business finance deals. While the
economy has recently demonstrated signs of steady, if slow, growth,
financial turmoil from events around the world raise cautions about the
sustainability and trajectory of growth. in the U.S. economy. Small
businesses face uncertainty from the costs of health care and regulatory
mandates of the PPACA. Given the pressure of the federal deficit, there
continues to be uncertainty about. the possibility and size of potential tax
rate increases that would increase costs for small businesses and reduce the
value potential of small business financing.
So, how has the "Great Recession" affected small business financing?
Economic cycles come and go, and the nature of the finance deal remains
the same. As the economy rebounds, the value created through small
business financing will also rebound and small businesses will more
effectively compete with larger business for the available supply of capital.
If that were the only issue, not much would have changed. However, the
"Great Recession" triggered significant policy actions that compounded the
effects of a weak economy. Government initiatives to subsidize, bail out
and stimulate sectors of the economy distorted financial markets by
arbitrarily making some businesses better candidates for financing than
others, thereby reducing access to non-favored firms and industries.
Financial market reforms have already increased the cost of various
financial resources relied upon by small businesses, and a whole slate of
financial market regulations have yet to be defined, much less understood
for their likely consequences. When all is said and done, it will be these
regulatory changes, their associated costs and the incentives they create that
will define the effects of the "Great Recession" on small business finance.
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